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 Abstract  
 
In the framework of the OSCE’s post-conflict rehabilitation activities, the police component 
is of increasing importance. The aim of the Centre for OSCE Research’s (CORE) project 
‘The OSCE and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Forces in The Balkans’, on which the 
findings of this report are based, was to analyze the OSCE police missions in Kosovo, 
Southern Serbia (Presevo Valley) and Macedonia, to inquire whether and to what extent 
multi-ethnic police services can help to overcome the legacy of ethno-political conflicts, 
and to study the problems confronting the OSCE, UN and EU when they developed and 
implemented their training concepts.  
 
The three central research questions were: Firstly, to what extent could multi-ethnic police 
forces be established in the post-war societies of the Western Balkans? Secondly, to what 
degree have the populations gained confidence in them? And thirdly, which factors explain 
the success or failure in establishing multi-ethnic police services? The findings of the study 
are primarily based on interviews with and surveys of about 700 local police officers and 
their OSCE, UN and EU police instructors and monitors in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and 
Macedonia.  
 
The results of the study are mixed. One clear success consists in the fact that the interna-
tional police missions were able in all three cases to recruit and train as many officers as 
planned. Furthermore, a general climate of professionalism and comradeship has deve-
loped within the multi-ethnic police units. Moreover, in all three cases the ethnic Albanian 
population has gained confidence in the new police forces. 
 
However, a number of negative aspects must also be mentioned. In contrast to the ethnic 
Albanian population, ethnic Serbs and Macedonians view the multi-ethnic units with much 
scepticism. In addition, there are considerable problems with integrating the multi-ethnic 
units into the regular Serbian and Macedonian police forces, in particular into the special 
police forces that fight organized crime and terrorism. The prime reason for this poor inte-
gration is the insufficient training of the new police officers. The low educational level of 
many ethnic Albanian police applicants poses a significant obstacle to their further educa-
tion.  
 
The fact that unsuitable police applicants were nevertheless recruited is due to the political 
pressure by all ethnic communities. In addition, international actors in Kosovo had severe 
problems in gaining reliable information about the applicants, because relevant documents 
had vanished during the war. Other reasons for the often unprofessional performance of 
new police officers were rooted in the over-centralized command structures of the Serbian 
and Macedonian post-socialist police forces that also give way to political interference into 
the police service. A related problem is the very low salaries of police officers that provide 
fertile ground for corruption. Finally, effective police work was hampered in all three cases 
by the severe deficits within the judiciary.  
 
The conclusion is that states and international organizations should be prepared to provide 
a sufficient level of resources over a longer period to secure the sustainability of police re-
form. In addition, they should exert more political pressure on the political actors of the 
host countries to combat the structural deficits in the police services and the judiciary. 
Moreover, additional efforts are needed to achieve better integration of minority officers in 
all branches of the police services, and to further promote the acceptance of the multi-
ethnic police units within the ethnic Serbian and Macedonian communities.  
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 Zusammenfassung 
 
Im Rahmen der Post-conflict Rehabilitation Activities der OSZE spielen die Polizeikom-
ponenten eine immer bedeutendere Rolle. Das Ziel der diesem Beitrag zugrunde liegen-
den Studie „Die OSZE und der Aufbau Multiethnischer Polizeien auf dem Balkan“, die am 
Zentrum für OSZE-Forschung (CORE) durchgeführt wurde, bestand darin, die OSZE-
Polizeimissionen im Kosovo, in Südserbien (Presevotal) und Mazedonien dahingehend zu 
untersuchen, ob und wieweit es mit Hilfe des Instruments multiethnischer Polizeien mög-
lich ist, die Folgen ethnopolitischer Konflikte zu überwinden sowie zu analysieren, vor wel-
chen Problemen OSZE, UN und EU standen, als sie entsprechende Ausbildungskonzepte 
entwarfen und umsetzten. 
 
Die drei zentralen Forschungsfragen lauteten: Erstens, inwieweit ist es in den Nachbürger-
kriegsgesellschaften des Westbalkans innerhalb weniger Jahre gelungen, funktionierende 
multiethnische Polizeien aufzubauen? Zweitens, inwieweit haben die Bevölkerung und ins-
besondere die Minderheiten Vertrauen in die neue Polizei gefasst? Und drittens, welche 
Faktoren erklären den Erfolg bzw. Misserfolg beim Aufbau multiethnischer Polizeien? 
 
Die Ergebnisse der Studie beruhen primär auf Interviews und schriftlichen Befragungen 
von rund 700 einheimischen Polizisten und deren internationalen Ausbildern und Beobach-
tern von der OSZE, EU und UNO im Kosovo, in Südserbien und in Mazedonien.  
 
Die Untersuchung kommt zu einer differenzierten Erfolgsbewertung der Implementierung 
der Missionsmandate. Positiv kann zunächst festgehalten werden, dass alle Missionen die 
Vorgaben für die Anzahl an zu rekrutierenden und auszubildenden Polizisten erfüllt bzw. 
übertroffen haben. Darüber hinaus hat sich in allen drei Untersuchungsfällen in den multi-
ethnischen Polizeieinheiten ein kollegiales und professionelles Klima entwickelt. Ferner 
können die Missionen in allen drei Fällen positiv verbuchen, dass der Aufbau der multi-
ethnischen Einheiten insbesondere bei der albanischen Bevölkerungsgruppe einen ver-
trauensbildenden Effekt erzielt hat. 
 
Neben diesen grundlegenden positiven Ergebnissen ist jedoch eine Reihe negativer As-
pekte zu vermerken: Im Gegensatz zur albanischen Bevölkerung betrachten Serben und 
slawische Mazedonier die multiethnischen Einheiten weiterhin mit Skepsis. In Südserbien 
und Mazedonien gibt es darüber hinaus noch große Probleme, die multiethnischen Ein-
heiten in die allgemeinen Polizeiapparate zu integrieren. Besonders schwierig stellt sich 
die Kooperation der multiethnischen Einheiten mit den zur Terror- und Kriminalitätsbe-
kämpfung eingesetzten Spezialeinheiten dar. Primär ursächlich für die mangelhafte Inte-
gration der multiethnischen Einheiten ist der unzureichende Ausbildungsstand der neuen 
Polizisten. Die Gründe hierfür liegen zum einen in den Bildungsdefiziten vieler albanischer 
Polizeianwärter. Zum anderen tragen strukturelle und konzeptionelle Defizite der Grund-
ausbildung an den Akademien und in den Praxisphasen zum unzureichenden Ausbil-
dungsstand der neuen Polizeibeamten bei. 
 
Dass Polizeibewerber, die aufgrund ihrer Bildungsdefizite, krimineller Hintergründe oder 
anderer negativer Persönlichkeitsmerkmale für den Polizeidienst nicht geeignet sind, aber 
dennoch rekrutiert wurden, lag am Einfluss politischer Parteien und Rebellengruppen auf 
das Rekrutierungsverfahren sowie an den spezifischen Problemen der Informationsge-
winnung durch internationale Rekrutierer unter Nachkriegsbedingungen.  
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 Weitere Ursachen für das vielfach unprofessionelle Auftreten einheimischer Polizisten lie-
gen in strukturellen Defiziten der Polizeiapparate post-sozialistischer Transformationsge-
sellschaften. So lassen die extrem zentralisierten Befehlsstrukturen in Südserbien und Ma-
zedonien nur sehr wenig Eigeninitiative zu. In allen drei Fällen fanden sich zudem Beispie- 
le, bei denen die Zentralisierung mit einer anhaltenden Politisierung der Polizei, das heißt 
direkter politischer Einflussnahme auf operative Maßnahmen sowie auf die Karrierewege 
der Polizisten einherging. Die sehr niedrigen Gehälter der Polizisten bilden in Verbindung 
mit der vorherrschenden Korruptionskultur in den Gesellschaften des Untersuchungsraums 
den Nährboden für verbreitete Korruption bei der Polizei. Schließlich wird eine effektive 
Polizeiarbeit in allen drei Untersuchungsfällen durch die großen Defizite in den Justizsyste-
men massiv behindert.  
 
Die Schlussfolgerung lautet, dass es grundsätzlich erforderlich ist, dass Staaten und inter-
nationale Organisationen über einen längerfristigen Zeitraum ausreichend finanzielle und 
materielle Ressourcen sowie eine größere Anzahl qualifizierter Ausbilder für Polizeimissio-
nen bereitstellen. Mit Blick auf die Nachhaltigkeit von Polizeireformen muss die internatio-
nale Gemeinschaft stärkeren politischen Druck auf die Politik der Gastgeberländer aus-
üben, um die strukturellen Defizite in den lokalen Polizeiapparaten sowie in der Justiz ab-
zuschwächen. Darüber hinaus ist politischer Druck auch notwendig, um ethnische Minder-
heiten in alle Polizeibereiche zu integrieren. Und schließlich ist es erforderlich, mehr für die 
Akzeptanz der multiethnischen Polizei bei Serben und slawischen Mazedoniern zu wer-
ben. Denn nur wenn auch deren Akzeptanz langfristig wächst, kann von einem wirklichen 
Integrationserfolg gesprochen werden.  
 
 6 
 1. Introduction: Policing in Ethno-Political Post-Conflict 
 Situations∗
 
The police components of international post-conflict peace building missions, which deal 
with peace consolidation after the resolution of violent intra-state conflicts,1 are of increa-
sing importance. A prime feature of intra-state conflicts is the challenging of the states’ ‘in-
ternal sovereignty’2 by domestic actors (sometimes supported by external ones) who call 
into question the legitimacy of the state’s monopoly of force. If this monopoly is challenged 
and the state is no longer able to provide ‘security, law and a reasonable amount of order’3 
for all citizens, intra-state security dilemmas arise.4 If citizens or groups believe that poten-
tial rivals will not be restrained by state authority, they will take security into their own 
hands by arming themselves, thus initiating an ‘intra-state arms race’.  
 
In order to re-establish the state’s legitimate monopoly of force, which, according to Seng-
haas, is ‘of paramount importance for any modern peace order’5 and to secure a sustain-
able peace process, citizens must be disarmed, the parties to the conflict demobilized and 
demilitarized, and the armed forces reconstituted.6 In addition, it is particularly important to 
reform or even completely restructure the domestic police forces. After international police 
have withdrawn, the (re-)established democratic police services7 must have both the ability 
and the will to prevent human rights violations, protect democratic institutions and reso-
lutely fight corruption, organized crime and terrorism. The ability to provide public security 
for all population groups is a basic precondition for the socio-economic stabilization of cri-
sis regions.8
 
 
1.1 The Ethno-Political Dimension of Police Reform 
 
The establishment of ethnically mixed police forces within multi-ethnic societies in the  
aftermath of violent conflicts presents a particular challenge for police reforms. In an envi-
ronment which is characterized by ethnically motivated hatred and social mistrust, police 
forces must be constituted from members of all population groups. Otherwise, the popula-
tion or at least certain minority groups will have no confidence in the security forces and 
will either flee or rely on vigilantism. The intra-state security dilemma would then continue. 
However, the key question, particularly in view of the high hopes implied in police mission 
mandates, is whether and to what extent it is possible to unite members of antagonistic 
ethnic communities in one and the same police force and to develop a spirit of professio- 
                                                 
∗  This article is based on the findings of the research project ‘The OSCE and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police 
Forces in the Balkans’ conducted between 2003 and 2005 at the Centre for OSCE Research (CORE) at the Insti-
tute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), and funded by the German 
Foundation for Peace Research (DSF). A comprehensive discussion of the research findings can be found in 
Stodiek 2006.  
1  For a definition of the concept of peacebuilding see Schneckener 2005, pp. 17-30. 
2  Holsti 1996, p. 94. 
3  Ibid. 
4  For an excellent analysis of intra-state security dilemmas see Kafir 2004, pp. 53-76. 
5  Senghaas 2004, p. 28. In addition to the state monopoly of force, Senghaas mentions five other ‘essential condi-
tions for the civilised – i.e. the non-violent – resolution of unavoidable conflicts in societies’: rule of law; affect con-
trol, democratic participation, social justice and equity, and constructive conflict management (pp. 28-31).  
6  Cf. Perthes 2000, p. 447. 
7  According to Call and Bayley, key characteristics of ‘democratic policing’ are: civilian control of the police, police re-
sponsiveness to the needs of the population and the accountability of the police to multiple external audiences (cf. 
Call 2000, p. 9; Bayley 1985). 
8  Cf. McCartney/Fischer/Wils 2004, p. 5; Matthies 2004, pp. 47-50; Ferdowsi/Matthies 2003, p. 33; Perthes 2000, p. 
447. 
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 nalism and comradeship within these multi-ethnic police units, without which effective co-
operation is impossible.  
 
Moreover, the example of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina has shown that pa-
rallel chains of command and loyalties based on membership in specific ethnic groups can 
persist in reformed police units, seriously undermining their performance.9 Separate agen-
das of the different ethnic components of the police can lead to openly arbitrary perfor-
mance of police officers with respect to the members of other ethnic communities. A num-
ber of examples show how indigenous police officers have either acted inadequately or not 
at all when dealing with riot control or investigations concerning members of their own eth-
nic group. The reason for this failure is partially rooted in the open partisanship towards 
one’s own ethnic group. In addition, police officers are exposed to strong social pressure 
from their own ethnic groups. 
 
The creation of a multi-ethnic police service does not take place in a socio-political vacuum 
and its mere existence does not guarantee its acceptance by all ethnic groups. Even if the 
police behave appropriately and protect the rights of all citizens in an unbiased way, some 
ethnic groups may need more time to gain confidence. For this reason comprehensive and 
long-lasting confidence-building programmes such as ‘community policing’10 are necessa-
ry.  
 
The integration of members of ethnic minorities into the police is closely related to the rein-
tegration of former regular and irregular combatants. This can lead to a particular dilemma: 
Demobilization programmes are usually doomed to failure, if former combatants are not 
given economic perspectives. In collapsed post-war economies, the integration of former 
combatants into police and/or military forces often appears to be the only quick solution to 
this problem. However, if the incorporation of former combatants does not succeed, there 
is a serious risk of a sharp rise in organized crime, based on the close relationship bet-
ween members of former armed units.11 Furthermore, acting according to the principles of 
the rule of law and democracy constitutes a great challenge for former combatants. Thus, 
their incorporation may hinder the functioning of multi-ethnic police units as well as their 
acceptance by the population. 
 
Even if the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants proves to be successful, 
a sharp increase in (organized) crime is almost unavoidable in post-conflict societies with 
war-shattered economies.12 In the fight against organized crime, the question for police re-
formers is whether to resort to existing experienced, but publicly discredited, police forces 
or to rely on the newly established police units that are trained to respect human rights, but 
are inexperienced in fighting crime. The support of international police forces frequently 
makes no great difference, because they are usually not familiar with the local languages, 
culture, and police laws, let alone the local criminal structures.13 However, without success 
in fighting crime, the police will not gain trust among the population and this may worsen 
the security situation in general. 
 
                                                 
9  Cf. Stodiek 2004a, p. 210; Hansen 2003, p. 187. 
10  According to a definition by the OSCE, community policing aims at fostering the co-operation between the police 
and the population in identifying and resolving issues of concern to the citizens, e.g. problems of crime, social dis-
order or the ‘overall quality of life in the community’ (OSCE 2003, p. 22). 
11  Cf. Perthes 2000, p. 447; Call/Stanley 2001, p. 154. 
12  Cf. O’Neill 2003, pp. 154ff.  
13  Cf. Stodiek 2004b, p. 217; Call/Stanley 2001, p. 164. 
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 1.2 Structural Deficiencies of Post-Socialist Police Forces 
 
Beyond the above-mentioned challenges to creating multi-ethnic police services, police re-
forms in the transformation societies of Eastern- and South-Eastern Europe have been 
confronted with particular structural deficiencies. These societies are characterized by an 
unfinished process of modernization and development14 and exhibit hybrid forms of intel-
lectual constructs that combine traditional and modern elements. The functional differentia-
tion of the state is still incomplete. Although these states have undergone fundamental so-
cial change, cultural patterns, not congruent with the requirements of legal rational state-
hood, are still present in the habits of actors. This contradiction has led to the creation of 
hybrid forms of governance, which combine political and economic power options, the in-
sufficient division of public and private spheres, the paramount importance of personalized 
politics, and the break up of formal legal rules through the clientelistic law of reciprocity.15 
Typical structural deficiencies of transformation societies are the weak performance of de-
mocratic institutions, state-controlled economic structures, underdeveloped civil societies, 
a lack of political accountability and transparency as well as severe shortcomings in the 
rule of law.16 With respect to the police, these shortcomings include aspects such as the 
over-centralization, politicization and militarization of the police apparatus as well as re-
cords of human right abuses and endemic corruption. These structural deficiencies have 
posed additional obstacles to the creation of democratic police services in post-conflict set-
tings. The particular structural deficiencies and dysfunctions of the post-Yugoslav police 
will be described in detail below (see chapter 3.1).  
 
 
1.3 Resource Problems and the Question of Reform Ownership  
 
Alongside the ethno-political and structural obstacles, international police reform missions 
usually have to cope with substantial resource problems. Reform efforts have frequently 
suffered from a severe lack of qualified personnel, lack of standardized curricula and text-
books, and a scarcity of material and financial resources for equipping international police 
instructors. This lack of resources has made the training of domestic police forces much 
more difficult. Moreover, local governments have also often been short of resources for 
providing their police officers with adequate equipment and pay.  
 
Local governments must have a sense of ownership if the reform process is to be success-
ful. If governments and local administrative bodies do not fully support the reforms, they 
will not be sustainable.17 However, reforming the police is a very sensitive issue for every 
government, because it ‘touches the heart of a state’s sovereignty and its monopoly of co-
ercive means’.18 Resistance to reform may, of course, not only come from the government, 
but also from within the police. Police forces show a tendency to adhere to traditional struc-
tures and assumptions that constrain reform options, particularly if these forces used to en-
joy privileges under authoritarian regimes and sometimes even formed a state within a 
state.19 It may therefore not always be easy for international organizations to get the sup-
port they need from their local counterparts. The best way to secure support from local 
governments is to involve them in the development of the reform process at every stage, 
                                                 
14  Cf. Matthies 1994, p. 11. 
15  Cf. Kößler 1994; Schlichte 2000; Schlichte/Wilke 2000. 
16  Cf. Ackermann 2002, p. 118; Lindholt 2003, p. 12f. 
17  Cf. Eide/Holm 2000, p. 5. 
18  Hansen 2003, p. 176. 
19  Cf. Wulf 2004, p. 14; Hänggi 2005, p. 124. 
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 making them see the immediate benefits of training, and to offer them political incentives 
right up to the possibility of EU and NATO accession in the future.20  
 
Furthermore, the reform process must be perceived as legitimate by the local population, 
otherwise the international organizations’ efforts may be seen as assisting the coercive 
apparatus of an illegitimate government. The public will become even more distrustful if 
this assistance includes technical support such as riot-control or surveillance equipment.  
 
                                                 
20  Cf. Hänggi 2005, p. 122; Lindholt/de Mesquita/Titus/Alemika 2003, pp. 173, 177. 
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 2. Objectives and Methodology of the CORE Study  
 
The (re-)establishment and/or reform of multi-ethnic democratic police services have be-
come an integral part of peace-building missions by the UN, the OSCE and the EU. In 
2005, worldwide 13 out of 17 post-conflict peace-building missions included a police com-
ponent, tasked with creating, reforming and/or training local police forces.  
 
Following its first engagement in police monitoring in Croatia,21 the OSCE has become a 
key player in the field of training and reforming police forces in the Western Balkans: since 
June 1999 in Kosovo, since May 2001 in the south Serbian Presevo valley, and since Au-
gust 2001 in Macedonia. While bearing the main responsibility for the basic training of local 
police officers and providing assistance to local authorities in reforming the police services, 
the OSCE police components have co-operated with their counterparts from the UN (Uni-
ted Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo/UNMIK) and the EU (EUPOL Pro-
xima in Macedonia), as well as with a number of other international organizations, Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and bilateral state actors.  
 
The aim of the CORE study was to compare the international police activities of the OSCE, 
UN and EU in Kosovo, Southern Serbia (Presevo valley) and Macedonia in order to ana-
lyze whether and to what extent multi-ethnic police services can help to overcome the le-
gacy of ethno-political conflicts, as well as to identify the structural deficiencies of post-
socialist security sectors and to study the problems confronting the OSCE, UN and EU 
when they developed and implemented their training and reform concepts.  
 
The findings of the study are based on the analysis of a number of documents and re-
search reports published by international organizations and NGOs as well as on numerous 
oral interviews and a comprehensive written survey with local police officers and their in-
structors and monitors from the OSCE, the UN and the EU in Kosovo, Southern Serbia 
and Macedonia, which were carried between September 2003 and June 2005.  
 
 
2.1 The Written Survey  
 
The survey was conducted with representative samples of international police officers and 
local police officers belonging to (at least) the two largest ethnic groups in each mission 
area. Questionnaires were distributed at police academies and at police stations with multi-
ethnic staff. Other criteria for the selection of police stations were that they be located in 
the biggest municipalities as well as in particular hot spots of inter-ethnic conflicts.  
 
Altogether, 1,016 questionnaires were distributed, of which 692 were returned. This corre-
sponds to a return rate of 68.1%. In Kosovo, questionnaires were distributed to 130 police 
cadets at the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS) in Vucitrn, to 250 officers of the Koso-
vo Police Service (KPS), to 50 OSCE police instructors and to 100 UNMIK police officers, 
including field trainers, station commanders, shift leaders and patrol officers, in the follow-
ing referred to as UNMIK police monitors. In Macedonia, questionnaires were given to 100 
police cadets, 150 local police officers, six OSCE police instructors, and 50 EUPOL Pro-
xima police monitors (including co-locators at stations, monitors and advisors). In South 
                                                 
21  In October 1998, an OSCE Police Monitoring Group continued the police monitoring task of two predecessor mis-
sions by the UN, which had initially established and trained a multi-ethnic police force in Croatia’s Eastern Slavonia 
region; see Stodiek 2004a, pp. 128-158.  
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 Serbia the sample comprised 150 local police officers as well as 30 former OSCE instruc-
tors.  
 
In addition to the standardized written surveys, more than 100 semi-structured oral inter-
views were conducted with police station commanders in all three mission areas; members 
of the KPS Counselling and Support Teams (KPS-CAST) in Kosovo, responsible for the 
psycho-social care of KPS officers; senior representatives of all missions; representatives 
of the ministries of the interior (Macedonia and Serbia); and a number of human rights 
NGOs. Because of the riots in March 2004, the reconciliation process between Serbs and 
Albanians in Kosovo suffered a heavy setback. Since the local police were also affected − 
investigations were conducted against ethnic Albanian officers accused of severe miscon-
duct, and ethnic Serbian officers were dismissed because they adamantly refused to fur-
ther co-operate with their Albanian colleagues −, the assumption was, that the findings of 
the September 2003 survey regarding the inter-ethnic climate in the KPS might no longer 
be valid. Therefore, a number of additional interviews was carried out with senior represen-
tatives of UNMIK police and the OSCE-lead KPSS in March 2005.The following map 
shows police stations in the three mission areas visited during the field research. 
 
 
2.2 Research Questions and Variables of Analysis 
 
The three central research questions of the study are: 
• To what extent was it possible for multi-ethnic police forces to be established in 
the post-war societies of the Western Balkans? 
• To what degree have the populations gained confidence in them? 
• Which factors explain the success or failure in establishing multi-ethnic police ser-
vices? 
To answer these questions, we introduced the dependent variables ‘status of the creation 
and integration of multi-ethnic police units’ and ‘degree of acceptance of the multi-ethnic 
police in the population’. The dependent variable ‘status of the creation and integration of 
multi-ethnic police units’ is operationalized on the basis of the proportion of members of 
ethnic minorities in the multi-ethnic police, the inter-ethnic social climate within the police, 
the integration of the multi-ethnic police elements within the general police structure as well 
as the general performance of the multi-ethnic police forces in the three mission areas. 
The second dependent variable ‘degree of acceptance of the multi-ethnic police in the po-
pulation’ is operationalized on the basis of surveys of citizens’ perceptions of the police 
and the degree of citizens’ co-operation with the police, and with the help of the self-per-
ception of local police officers with respect to their acceptance in the population.  
 
The results of our dependent variables will be explained on the basis of the independent 
variables ‘ethno-political conflict constellation’ and ‘structural aspects of the police appara-
tus’, as well as with the help of the intervening variable ‘impact of international actors on 
the process of police reform’.  
 
The independent variable ‘ethno-political conflict constellation’ will be operationalized on 
the basis of the conflict intensity in the three cases, e.g. the number of casualties, refugees 
and displaced persons, as well as the violent actions of the security forces and rebel move-
ments (see 3.2). The independent variable ‘structural aspects of the police apparatus’ is 
operationalized on the basis of the recruitment situation with a special view to the inclusion 
of former combatants and members of political parties, the achieved level of general edu- 
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 cation and police training of the police cadets and officers, and the structural deficiencies 
of the legal systems of the countries concerned in terms of the politicization and centra- 
lization of the police, the level of corruption, the quality of the legal foundations of police 
work, and the availability of material resources (see 3.1). This discussion of the entire legal 
system is necessary, because its effectiveness is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the 
police in providing order and security. If legal and judicial reform lags behind police reform, 
a feeling of impunity among the population and one of frustration and cynicism among po-
lice officers might develop, leading to improper behaviour or vigilantism.22
 
 
2.3 Problems in Evaluating the Results of Police Reform  
 
While it is rather easy to evaluate the quantitative criteria of police reform − the numbers of 
police officers recruited, trained and integrated − it is much more difficult to evaluate the 
qualitative criteria, particularly the levels of police performance.23 For the qualitative evalu-
ation of police performance, a comprehensive set of direct and indirect indicators has to be 
analyzed. Direct performance indicators include crime statistics, clear-up rates for crimes, 
as well as assessments by international police monitors and human rights NGOs covering 
aspects such as the record of human rights abuses or police corruption. Indirect indicators 
include the public perception of the police, the personal feeling of security within the popu-
lation, the scale of illegal distribution of small arms among the population as well as the le-
vel of co-operation between the public and the police.24 In view of the specific reform task 
of creating multi-ethnic police units, the inter-ethnic climate within the police units and at 
the police academies represents an additional performance factor. Except for clear-up 
rates which were not consistently available for all three cases studies, all other indicators 
are analyzed in the case studies.  
                                                 
22  See for example Call/Stanley 2001, p. 168. 
23  For a general discussion of the difficulties of defining the success of reforms see German/Chalmers 2005, pp. 299-
308. 
24  See Boeden 1988, p. 67. 
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 3. Police Reform and the Yugoslav Legacy 
 
3.1 Structural Deficiencies within the Police System 
 
In pre-war Yugoslavia as in other communist states, police forces were dysfunctional in the 
sense that they served the state, meaning the ruling party, rather than the public. Through-
out the Balkans, the popular perception emerged, particularly among ethnic minorities, that 
the police were biased in favour of certain ethnic and/or political groups.25 During the Milo-
šević era, ethnic minorities such as the Albanians in Kosovo, Muslims in Sandzak, Roma 
throughout Serbia, but also other minorities such as homosexuals suffered from police dis-
crimination, unlawful arrests, and ill-treatment. However, not only minorities but also citi-
zens opposing the Milošević regime faced excessive use of force by the police, as did jour-
nalists who covered such incidents.26 With respect to the recruitment and promotion of po-
lice officers, their loyalty to the regime was more important than their professionalism. 
Their prime task was not to investigate and solve criminal cases, but to demonstrate power 
and to vigorously enforce public order.27 In the early 1990s, the Serbian police was restruc-
tured, and many refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were integrated into 
the police. Although they were well paid, they did not receive Serbian citizenship. As any 
regime change would have threatened their position, they were very loyal to the govern-
ment and regarded the opposition as an enemy.28 The criminal police dealt rather with o
position against the state than with criminal acts involving citizens.
p-
                                                
29  
 
Due to the economic decline during the last phase of the Tito regime, corruption within the 
police increased. However, the criminalization of the police, from the lower ranks to the top 
leadership, reached its climax in the 1990s during the Milošević era. Corruption within the 
police became the norm. The negative consequences of the state-directed command eco-
nomy had already led to a growing black market in the 1970s and 1980s, on which not only 
citizens but also companies relied. The rise of the black market went hand in hand with the 
increase in corruption of those state officials ostensibly tasked with fighting it. The accep-
tance of bribes gave these officers the opportunity to improve their living standard despite 
the general economic decline. Another source of additional ‘income’ was pocketing road 
traffic fines. In order to become promoted to such lucrative positions, police officers had to 
bribe their superiors. Secret service and customs officers also profited from the illegal im-
port of high-tech products from Western countries.30
 
Corruption increased in the same way as the state economy declined, due in part as well 
to the UN economic sanctions over the course of the Balkan wars.31 A governmental distri-
bution system based on licenses had to be established for scarce commodities.32 The 
state and the leading party had enormous influence on the economy. Furthermore, state 
authorities issued vouchers for special goods for the friends of the regime. With the begin-
ning of the UN embargo, the smuggling of weapons, oil, foreign currencies, drugs, ciga-
rettes, alcohol and food literally exploded. The margins of profit allowed for bribing customs 
 
25  Cf. OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2001c, p. 15; Caparini/Day 2002, p. 6; Hansen 2003, pp. 
177f.; Babovic 2002, pp. 53 and 59; Caparini 2004, p. 256. 
26  Cf. Human Rights Watch 1999 and 1997. 
27  Cf. Caparini/Day 2002, p. 6f. 
28  Cf. International Crisis Group 2000b, p. 8. 
29  Cf. Caparini/Day 2002, pp. 6f. 
30  Cf. Center for the Study of Democracy 2004, pp. 41f. and 48; Transparency International Serbia 2001, p. 63. 
31  Cf. OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2001c, pp. 13 and 15; Caparini/Day 2002, p. 6; Mappes-
Niediek 2003, p. 53. 
32  Cf. Mappes-Niediek 2003, pp. 45f. 
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 and police officers. Police escorts for transports of illicit goods were common practice.33 In 
some cases, police officers even participated in the trafficking of heroin.34
 
Milošević had already laid the foundations for the interconnectedness between politics, po-
lice and organized crime in the early 1990s. In 1991, he replaced the whole staff of the se-
cret service with people of his choice.35 The connection between police and organized 
crime was most obvious on the payrolls of the Serbian ministry of the interior that con-
tained a number of well known figures in the underworld.36 The regime used small-time 
and major criminals for its dirty purposes.37 Secret service and police officers co-operated 
with crime bosses in assassinating defectors or politicians who represented an obstacle for 
Milošević. Starting in 1991, more than 150 unsolved murders of that kind took place, in-
cluding more than 60 of Yugoslav émigrés residing predominantly in Western Europe. Al-
leged criminals often carried police identification. According to the Center for the Study of 
Democracy (CSD), the systematic employment of criminals was initiated by the later chief 
of the uniformed police and vice-minister of the interior, Radovan Stojičić.38 The most pro-
minent crime figures handling extra-legal deeds on orders of the police or the state security 
were Źeljko Ražnatović ‘Arkan’ and Jovica Stanišić ‘Giska’.39  
 
Arkan and Giska, did not only act in secret, but earned an infamous reputation for the atro-
cities they and their paramilitary units committed among the non-Serb communities in Cro-
atia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo during the Balkan wars of the 1990s.40 It was 
not only their units, which committed war crimes, but also some special police units milita-
rized, in terms of equipment and structures, by Milošević. These paramilitary police units 
have been accused of carrying out many more war crimes than the armed forces them-
selves.41  
 
In Macedonia, the structural deficiencies mentioned above more or less survived the coun-
try’s peaceful secession from Yugoslavia. The police were as politicized and centralized as 
in Serbia, and violated the human rights of citizens to the same extent. Rather than ethni-
city, the common characteristic of victims was usually their ‘oppositional political activity or 
low social-economic status’.42 Individuals were sometimes arrested without a warrant and 
beaten until they confessed to a crime. Corruption was as endemic as in Serbia, and due 
to the international sanctions against Yugoslavia and the simultaneous Greek economic 
embargo against Macedonia in the course of the dispute over Macedonia’s official name, 
smuggling had also exploded in Macedonia leading to an interconnectedness between po-
lice, politics and organized crime similar to that in Serbia. 
 
Similar to the situation in Serbia, parts of the Macedonian police were also militarized; the 
difference between the military and the police became blurred in terms of competencies, 
weaponry and structures. Both institutions became closely associated as the government 
turned to the military to shore up the police’s capacity to maintain internal power with coer-
                                                 
33  Cf. Center for the Study of Democracy 2004, p. 48; Mappes-Niediek 2003, pp. 30f. and 53. 
34  Cf. OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2001c, p. 13; Caparini/Day 2002, p. 6. 
35  Cf. International Crisis Group 2000b, p. 7. 
36  Cf. Center for the Study of Democracy 2004, p. 49. 
37  Cf. Caparini/Day 2002, p. 7f.; Mappes-Niediek 2003, pp. 37f. 
38  Cf. Mappes-Niediek 2003, pp. 41f. 
39  Cf. Mappes-Niediek 2003, pp. 30f.; Center for the Study of Democracy 2004, p. 42. 
40  Cf. Mappes-Niediek 2003, pp. 30f. 
41  Cf. OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2001c, p. 15; Caparini/Day 2002, p. 6; Hansen 2003, p. 
178; Mani 2000, p. 11; Amnesty International 1999; Human Rights Watch 1999. 
42  Human Rights Watch 1998. 
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 cive means, particularly during the violent conflict in 2001.43 In addition to the already exist-
ing special police task force (the ‘Tigers’) and units of police reservists, used in fighting the 
UCK (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves) rebels, the then Macedonian minister of the interior, 
Ljube Boškovski, created his own paramilitary police unit (the ‘Lions’) in 2001. This unit, 
acting under Boškovski’s direct command, acquired a notorious reputation for its intimida-
ting and violent behaviour against the Albanian population44 culminating in the brutal police 
raid on the Albanian village of Ljuboten on 12 August 2001, just one day before the signing 
of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. The village was first shelled by the army. After the ‘Li-
ons’ had entered the village, houses were blown up, detained civilians severely beaten and 
shot, and ten villagers killed. Boškovski himself and a commanding officer of the Lions 
have been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in this 
context for violating the laws or customs of war.45 While this incident seems to be the only 
case of police involvement in war crimes, the Albanian population, nevertheless, has still 
no trust in any of the Macedonian special police forces. 
 
 
3.2 The Legacies of Ethno-Political Violent Conflict  
 
The three cases differ significantly in terms of the level of violence during the conflict peri-
ods. In Kosovo, the level of violence was by far the highest. Serbian security forces and 
the paramilitary gangs of Arkan and others used brutal force against the Albanian popula-
tion both before and, in particular, during the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, 
and committed atrocities and large scale acts of ‘ethnic cleansing’. On the other hand, 
members of the Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves/UCK) and 
ethnic Albanian civilians committed revenge killings and acts of ‘ethnic cleansing’ as well. 
This time, Serbian civilians became the victims. The number of Albanians killed by Serbs is 
estimated at about 10,000.46 Between June and November 1999, more than 200 Serbs 
were killed by Albanians. While approximately 860,000 Albanians were internally displaced 
or had fled from Kosovo by June 1999,47 about 150,000 Serbs and members of other mi-
norities fled to Serbia proper after July 1999.48  
 
In the south Serbian Presevo valley, the structure of the conflict was similar to that in Ko-
sovo. However, the level of violence was significantly lower. The municipalities of the Pre-
sevo valley, many inhabited by an ethnic Albanian majority, had been neglected economi-
cally by the Belgrade government for years. The Albanian population was discriminated 
against by the authorities. Attacks of the Albanian Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja 
und Bujanovac (Ushtria Clirimtare e Presheves Medvexhes dhe Bujanovicit/UCPMB) on 
Serbian security forces after January 2000 provoked massive retaliation by the police and 
the military.49 The new political constellation after the fall of Milošević in October 2000 as 
well as the desire of NATO not to see a new violent conflict develop within the Ground 
Safety Zone between Kosovo and Serbia proper paved the way for stopping the fights long 
before a level of violence similar to that in Kosovo had been reached. According to the In-
ternational Crisis Group, about 100 people were killed during the fights between the 
UCPMB and the security forces. 12,500 Albanians fled to Kosovo.50  
                                                 
43  Cf. Hansen 2003, p. 178. 
44  Cf. Ordanoski 2001; Matveeva/Hiscock/Paes/Risser 2003, pp. 22f. 
45  Cf. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 2004. 
46  Cf. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2000, p. 32.  
47  Cf. International Crisis Group 2000a, p. 2. 
48  Cf. Human Rights Watch 2001. 
49  Cf. International Crisis Group 2001a, p. 2. 
50  Cf. International Crisis Group 2003, p. 1. 
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 In Macedonia, the level of violence was comparable to that in South Serbia. Fighting bet-
ween the Albanian National Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimtare Kombetare/UCK) and the 
Macedonian security forces, starting in January 2001, caused about 100 casualties with a 
very small death toll among civilians.51 Because the peace agreement of August 2001 was 
reached rather quickly, the number of displaced persons was also rather low compared to 
Kosovo. About 108,000 Albanians and 40,000 ethnic Macedonians fled from the North-
Western Macedonian crisis region.52
 
Because of the much lower level of violence in South Serbia and Macedonia, we assume 
that the level of inter-ethnic hatred there is considerably lower than in Kosovo and that 
therefore the chances for the creation of multi-ethnic police services as well as for their ac-
ceptance in the population are significantly better. However, the hard line taken by anti-
terror police units against the ethnic Albanian population in South Serbia and Macedonia 
has undoubtedly deepened the mistrust against these units, which are still composed 
solely of ethnic Macedonian and Serbian officers today. 
 
The next chapter provides a brief description of the specific settings and mandates of the 
three case studies on police reform in Kosovo, South Serbia and Macedonia. In chapter 5, 
the conclusions of the three cases are compared and summarized, interrelating the values 
of the independent, intervening and dependent variables. Based on the study’s findings, 
recommendations are given with respect to the enhancement of the effectiveness of police 
training and reform missions. 
                                                 
51  Cf. Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung 2004. 
52  Cf. UNHCR 2001. 
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 4. The Police Reform Context: Case Settings and 
 Mission Mandates  
 
4.1 The Kosovo Case 
 
4.1.1 Setting 
After the complete withdrawal of the Serbian security forces from Kosovo within the frame-
work of the ‘Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force and the 
Governments of the Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia’, which ended the 
Kosovo war in June 1999,53 the incoming NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) were confronted with a danger-
ous security vacuum. Anarchy was spreading throughout this crisis-stricken province. 
 
4.1.2 Mandate 
In an attempt to cope with this situation, UN Secretary-General Annan formulated two main 
goals for UNMIK’s law enforcement strategy: the ‘provision of interim law enforcement ser-
vices and the rapid development of a credible, professional and impartial Kosovo Police 
Service’ (KPS).54 As soon as a credible national police force had been established, law en-
forcement authority was to be gradually transferred from UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) to 
the KPS.55 UNCIVPOL was responsible for law enforcement and the field training of the 
new KPS officers, while OSCE police instructors were supposed to provide the basic KPS 
training at the Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS),56 run by the OSCE Mission in Ko-
sovo (OMIK). Originally, a UNCIVPOL contingent of 3,10057 and 150 OSCE police instruc-
tors58 were designated for accomplishing these tasks. 
 
Building up the KPS consisted of three successive core steps: recruitment, academy trai-
ning, and field training. On this basis, the confidence of all ethnic communities of the local 
population was to be gained, and a number of reform obstacles inherited from both Yugos-
lavia’s socialist and Milošević eras needed to be tackled. Initially, the creation of a KPS 
contingent of 3,100 police officers was envisaged.59 However, UNMIK later expanded the 
size of the future KPS several times to finally 7,500 − an amount which was to be reached 
by December 2005.60 The composition was to be multi-ethnic, with at least nine per cent 
Serbian officers and seven per cent of officers belonging to other minorities. 20 per cent of 
the officers were to be women.61 Initially, police cadets were supposed to undergo five 
weeks of basic training at the police academy in Vucitrn, followed by 19 weeks of field trai-
ning with UNMIK police officers, and an additional 80 hours of advanced classroom trai-
ning provided by OMIK at the KPSS, before they were eligible for certification and inde-
pendent assignment.62 The tentative start date for training was 30 August 1999.63  
 
                                                 
53  Cf. NATO 1999. 
54  UNMIK 2003, p. 5. 
55  For a detailed description of UNMIK’s and KFOR’s mandates see United Nations Security Council 1999; and 
Stodiek 2004a, pp. 261-265. 
56  Cf. United Nations Security Council 1999; UNMIK 2003, p. 5; OSCE Permanent Council 1999, p. 1. 
57  The UNCIVPOL contingent was later expanded to 4,700 officers. 
58  Cf. UNMIK 199, p. 6; OSCE 1999, p. 2. 
59  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 1999b. 
60  Cf. OSCE 2004b. 
61  Cf. UNMIK 2003, p. 9. 
62  Cf. UNMIK 2000, pp. 2f.; OSCE Mission in Kosovo 1999a; OSCE Mission in Kosovo 1999b. By 2004, several revi-
sions of the training curriculum had finally led to an extension of academy and field training to 20 weeks each (cf. 
OSCE 2004a; OSCE Mission in Kosovo 2004, p. 2). 
63  Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 1999b. 
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 4.2 The South Serbia Case 
 
4.2.1 Setting 
In 2000, Albanian rebels of the Liberation Army for Presevo, Medvedja und Bujanovac 
(UCPMB) attacked Serbian security forces in the south Serbian region bordering on Ko-
sovo to emphasize their demands for greater autonomy of Albanian-inhabited municipali-
ties or the accession of the Presevo valley to Kosovo. Because the UCPMB withdrew after 
their attacks into the five-kilometer wide Ground Safety Zone between Serbia proper and 
Kosovo, access to which, according to the Military Technical Agreement of 1999, was re-
stricted for Serbian security forces, Serbia had no means of putting an end to the UCPMB 
actions.64 After the fall of Milošević in October 2000, the new government tried to reach a 
peaceful solution. In spring 2001, the then Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Nebojša Ĉović, 
who was also the President of the Co-ordinating Body of the Federal and Republic of Ser-
bia Governments responsible for Southern Serbia and Kosovo, developed a plan for the 
peaceful termination of the crisis in South Serbia. 
 
4.2.2 Mandate 
The so-called ‘Ĉović Plan’ laid out four objectives for the solution to the crisis: 
 
• ‘The elimination of all kinds of threats […] to state sovereignty and the territorial in-
tegrity of the Republic of Serbia’; 
 
• ‘The establishment of […] security […], freedom of movement […], ensured by the 
complete dis-banding and disarmament of terrorists, by the demilitarisation of the 
region and by allowing the return of all the refugees to their homes’; 
 
• ‘The development of a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society, based on de-
mocratic principles and the respect of all human, political and minority rights’; 
 
• ‘Prosperous and rapid economic and social development […]’.65 
 
Goal no. 3 was to be implemented with a view to the ‘harmonization of the ethnic struc-
tures of the employees in the civil services, […] with the ethnic structure of the popula-
tion’66, meaning that Albanian police officers were to be integrated into the existing Serbian 
police in the three municipalities, Medvedja, Bujanovac and Presevo. Ethnically mixed pat-
rols were to be introduced ‘when the indispensable conditions for that [were] fulfilled’.67 Ac-
cording to the Ĉović Plan, the restoration of security and peace also included the ‘withdra-
wal of extraordinarily engaged military and police forces, return or remaining of the regular 
police of mixed ethnic composition in settlements (stations, patrols and other forms of reg-
ular activities) and of regular military units, including the appropriate units at the line to-
wards Kosovo and Metohija and the border units at the border with Macedonia’.68
 
Ethnically mixed units were to be established, composed of a number of experienced Ser-
bian and former Albanian police officers and 400 new police officers, of which more than 
half would be of Albanian ethnicity. Those 400 new officers were to be trained at the police 
                                                 
64  Cf. International Crisis Group 2001a, pp. 5f. 
65  Ĉović 2001, p. 70. 
66  Ibid., p. 79. 
67  Ibid., p. 80. 
68  Ibid., pp. 80f. 
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 academy in Mitrovo Polje in three phases by May 2002.69 The newly established OSCE 
Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (OMiFRY),70 which had already assisted the 
Serbian authorities in restructuring and training their law enforcement agencies in general, 
was ready to provide the training for this new Multi-Ethnic Police Element (MEPE) and of-
fered 32 police trainers.71 The first training phase was to consist of just three five-day re-
fresher courses for 40 former Albanian and Serbian officers, to enable the first multi-ethnic 
police patrols to be established quickly. In the second training phase those 40 officers were 
to receive an additional five-weeks training. The third training phase, designed for the new 
recruits, was to cover 12 weeks of basic police training, followed by a 16-week field training 
delivered by Serbian instructors.72 The tentative start for the first training phase was 21 
May 2001.73  
 
 
4.3 The Macedonia Case 
 
4.3.1 Setting 
For a long time, Macedonia was perceived by many as an ‘island of peace in an ocean of 
inter-ethnic quarrels’. While it was commonly known that deep-seated tensions existed bet-
ween ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, Western observers were reassured by the fact 
that Albanian parties were consistently represented in Macedonia’s governing coalitions. 
This led them to overlook the growing ethnic segregation in the country which, together 
with a plethora of unresolved social and political problems, created the potential for the ex-
plosive inter-ethnic conflict that erupted in spring 2001. The fighting started in January 
2001, when the so-called National Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimitare Kombetare – UCK), 
which used the same abbreviation as the Albanian fighters in Kosovo, attacked several po-
lice stations and patrols in a number of villages along the border with Kosovo, and de-
clared those villages ‘liberated areas’. The poorly trained and badly equipped Macedonian 
police were not able to prevent further attacks. Fighting escalated and by August 2001, the 
UCK had gained control over the Albanian-dominated town of Tetovo as well as the north-
ern suburbs of the capital Skopje.74 60 members of the Macedonian military and police 
forces were killed and several officers kidnapped.75 While the UCK had initially fought for 
the liberation of the Albanians in Macedonia, from March on it demanded equal constitu-
tional rights and treatment for the Albanian population.76 Under heavy diplomatic pressure 
from the EU and the USA, the four most important ethnic Albanian and Macedonian par-
ties, with the approval of the UCK, finally signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement on 13 
August 2001. In exchange for substantial political reforms favouring the Albanian commu-
nity, the agreement put an end to the fighting and guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ma-
cedonia.77  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69  Cf. OSCE 2001b, p. 4. 
70  It was mandated by Permanent Council Decision No. 401, 11 January 2001, cf. OSCE 2001a, p. 1. 
71  Cf. OSCE Permanent Council 2001. 
72  Cf. OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2001b; interview with OMiSaM representative, Belgrade, 9 
August 2001. 
73  Cf. OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2001a. 
74  Cf. Paes/Schlotter 2002, p. 235. 
75  Cf. Peake 2004, p. 29. 
76  Cf. Ackermann 2002, pp. 119f. 
77  Cf. International Crisis Group 2001b; Council of Europe/Republic of Macedonia 2001.  
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 4.3.2 Mandate 
The Ohrid Accord called on the OSCE to support the Macedonian authorities in reforming 
the police, particularly by creating ethnically mixed units to be deployed in the crisis region 
to re-establish the state’s monopoly of force.78 The USA offered its International Criminal 
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to quickly train a first group of ethnic 
Macedonians and Albanians by December 2001. By July 2003, about 1,000 Albanian offi-
cers were to be integrated into the Macedonian police. By 2004, the Macedonian police 
force was generally to reflect the ethnic composition and distribution of the country’s popu-
lation.79 The OSCE offered 60 police advisers and 17 instructors to implement these tasks. 
The training curriculum developed by the OSCE in co-operation with the Macedonian Min-
istry of the Interior (MoI) foresaw a three-month basic training at the police academy in Idri-
zovo to be followed by six months of in-service training provided by Macedonian police of-
ficers.80  
 
In February 2002, the OSCE and the EU initiated a co-operative effort for police reform in 
Macedonia. Two police experts from the EU were seconded to the OSCE Police Develop-
ment Unit (PDU) of the OSCE Spillover and Monitor Mission to Skopje.81 In December 
2003, the EU significantly expanded its police-related activities in Macedonia by deploying 
the EU Police Mission ‘Proxima’. The mandate of the 180 Proxima police officers included 
monitoring and advising Macedonian police authorities on issues such as: 
 
• ‘The consolidation of law and order, including the fight against organised crime 
[…]’;  
 
• ‘The practical implementation of the comprehensive reform of the Minister of the 
Interior, including the police’;  
 
• ‘The operational transition towards, and the creation of a border police [...]’;  
 
• ‘The build up of confidence between the local police and the population’;  
 
• ‘Enhanced cooperation with neighbouring States in the field of policing.’82  
 
Proxima activities were to be coordinated with OSCE efforts and bilateral police projects of 
other international actors.83 Since the OSCE had cancelled its field training activities in 
2002, Proxima officers took charge of monitoring the performance of multi-ethnic police 
units at the police stations in the crisis region.84
 
 
                                                 
78  Cf. Schenker 2003, p. 176. 
79  See Annex C, Article 5.2 of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. In: Council of Europe/Republic of Macedonia 2001, p. 
5; OSCE 2001d, p. 4; OSCE 2001c; Berliner Morgenpost, 15 October 2001. 
80  Cf. OSCE 2002a. 
81  Cf. OSCE 2002b. 
82  European Union 2003 p. 2. 
83  Cf. ibid. 
84  Cf. European Union Police Mission Proxima 2004, p. 14.  
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 5. Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
 
5.1  Findings of the Three Case Studies 
 
A critical assessment of the implementation of the three mandates reveals mixed results. 
That the missions were able in all three cases to recruit and train as many officers as plan-
ned was a clear success. By 2006, about 7,500 officers were trained and deployed in eth-
nically mixed units in Kosovo, 400 in South Serbia, and 1,500 in Macedonia. 
 
Furthermore, a general climate of professionalism and comradeship has developed at the 
police academies and in the multi-ethnic units. This was more easily achieved in South 
Serbia and Macedonia, where the level of violence during the conflicts was comparatively 
low. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that in these two countries inter-ethnic communication 
and co-operation within the police is significantly better than in their respective societies as 
a whole. The most surprising finding, however, concerns Kosovo. In spite of the significant-
ly higher level of inter-ethnic violence during the Kosovo conflict, the inter-ethnic social cli-
mate at the KPSS and in the multi-ethnic units was judged to be almost as good as in 
South Serbia and Macedonia. This is the result of the extensive use made by UNMIK and 
OMIK of their capacity for intervention. After initially having been forced to live and work 
together in order not to lose their jobs, police officers of different ethnic groups developed 
the basic co-operative attitudes necessary for the joint execution of their tasks. This posi-
tive result is by no means cancelled out by the inter-ethnic problems the KPS experienced 
following the March 2004 riots. On the contrary, it is encouraging that inter-ethnic problems 
occurred only in a few police stations and that the multi-ethnic composition of the KPS in 
general was not endangered (see Excursus: The Kosovo Riots in March 2004 and the per-
formance of the KPS). 
 
A third positive achievement is the level of confidence in the new police that was reached 
in all three cases particularly among the Albanian population, but also among other minori-
ties such as Bosniaks, Turks, and Roma. In Kosovo, the local police enjoy a very good re-
putation, and in South Serbia and Macedonia, the Albanian communities have begun to 
turn to the multi-ethnic police with their concerns. This would have been almost unthink-
able for the mono-ethnic police forces before 2001. 
 
However, a number of failures and deficiencies must also be acknowledged. Unlike the 
ethnic Albanian population, ethnic Serbs and Macedonians view the multi-ethnic units with 
much scepticism, and, in the case of Kosovo, even with open rejection. In the Serb-
dominated northern part of Kosovo even Serbian KPS officers are not respected by the 
population. The Serbian population in this region prefers to rely on the parallel security 
structures still maintained by the Belgrade government. In the other Serbian enclaves 
across Kosovo, the attitude of the population towards the KPS is more positive. However, 
the population there is forced to accommodate itself to the KPS, as parallel Serbian secu-
rity structures do not exist. In South Serbia and Macedonia, the acceptance of the multi-
ethnic units is also rather low within the regular police apparatus, most visibly expressed 
by the inadequate integration of these units into the existing structures. In particular, co-
operation between multi-ethnic units and special police forces tasked with fighting orga-
nized crime and terrorism continues to be difficult. 
 
The prime reason for this lack of integration is the inadequate training of the new police of-
ficers. The poor level of education of many ethnic Albanian police applicants represents a  
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  Excursus: The Kosovo Riots of March 2004 and the Performance of the KPS  
 
  
 Performance during the March 2004 riots 
 
 On March 17, 2004, the heaviest inter-ethnic clashes broke out in Kosovo since the 
 end of fighting in July 1999, and lasted for nearly 48 hours. The clashes began after 
 several Kosovar media outlets propagated the rumour that four ethnic Albanian boys 
 had been chased into a river by ethnic Serbs in the Mitrovica region, with three of the 
 boys drowning.  
 
 The initially peaceful protests of several thousand Albanians in Mitrovica soon dege-
 nerated into a massive confrontation between ethnic Albanians and Serbs at the 
 main bridge which separates the Albanian- from the Serbian-dominated part of the 
 town. While the images of these clashes recalled similar incidents in this hot spot 
 over the previous four and a half years, this time the situation intensified, with hostili-
 ties escalating to unprecedented levels. Over 50,000 Albanians participated in the 
 anti-Serbian demonstrations, which occurred – first consecutively, then simultane- 
 ously – in more than 30 locations throughout Kosovo. The scale of violence took  
 both national and international security forces completely by surprise.85  
 
 Without any preparation for dealing with riots of this dimension, lacking equipment 
 such as riot control gear, shields, tear gas or rubber bullets, and with no contingency 
 plans, the majority of KPS officers behaved professionally and bravely and tried their 
 best to control the riots, prevent the mobs from attacking Serbian property and to 
 save the lives of Serbs, Roma and Ashkali.86 In view of the simultaneous escalation 
 of violence at more than 30 hot spots across Kosovo, they worked most of the time 
 with UNMIK officers within units hastily assembled because of the scarcity of avai-
 lable officers.87 Without the support of the KPS in communicating with the demon-
 strators, KFOR and UNMIK police would have been even more helpless to calm 
 the crowds down.88 In addition to 67 KFOR soldiers and 65 UNMIK police officers,  
 58 KPS officers were injured during the riots.89
 
 Investigations of accusations against KPS officers for misconduct during the  
 riots 
 
 Juxtaposed with the generally positive statements on the KPS’s performance given 
 by the UN and international think tanks were serious accusations of misconduct 
 made against Albanian KPS officers by Serbian citizens, NGOs and by Serbian KPS 
 officers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85  Cf. Stodiek 2004b, p. 214; Human Rights Watch 2004, pp. 19f. 
86  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2004a, p. 12. 
87  Interview with UNMIK police officers, Kosovo, May 2004. 
88  Cf. International Crisis Group 2004, p. 20. 
89  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2004a, p. 1. 
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 In addition to the most frequent accusation made, namely that many Albanian officers 
 had stood by passively watching the riots, the most serious accusations were that Al-
 banian officers had denounced their Serbian colleagues to the mob or that they had 
 even taken part in the riots.90 While there were no complaints from Serbs against KPS 
 officers in Prizren, the most serious complaints came from Serbs in Vucitrn, Obilic  and 
 Kosovo Polje.91
 
 During the investigations of the March 2004 riots, a number of UNMIK police officers 
 also complained that many Albanian KPS officers had undermined the investigations  
 by refusing to identify Albanian suspects on videotapes, often in cases where they  
 supposedly knew the subjects, since they knew whole communities of certain villages.92 
 In July 2004, investigations were underway against some 100 KPS officers for allega-
 tions of misconduct. However, no evidence was found to back up the most serious 
 allegations. Therefore, by March 2005, only about a dozen officers had been tempo-
 rarily suspended for disrupting radio communication during the riots.93 Compared to  
 the some 5,700 officers, who were on duty in March 2004, this small number of ac-
 cused and con victed officers is an indication that the share of ethnically motivated  fai-
 lures within the KPS was rather low. 
 
 Effects of the March 2004 violence on the social climate in the multi-ethnic police 
 units 
 
 After allegations of misconduct against ethnic Albanian KPS officers brought by their 
 Serbian colleagues, the inter-ethnic climate seriously deteriorated and mistrust re-
 emerged.94 The most serious incidents happened at the police station in Strpce, until 
 then one of the success stories of multi-ethnic policing in Kosovo. The Serbian station 
 comander and his Serbian staff categorically refused to co-operate further with their Al-
 banian colleagues and did not let the Albanians enter the station. When they also re-
 fused to co-operate with other Albanian officers, brought in from other stations, UNMIK 
 ended the blockade by dismissing the station commander and his Serbian deputy. Fa- 
 cing the potential consequences of their actions, Serbian staff of two other stations,
 which had also refused to co-operate with the Albanians, stopped their blockades and 
 agreed to resume the work of ethnically mixed patrols.95 UNMIK police monitored the 
 re-established mixed patrols for a couple of days. Since there were no incidents and no 
 complaints about the performance of the mixed units, the units went on patrol without 
 the presence of UNMIK police monitors. At least on the surface, things had returned to 
 normal by June 2004. 96  
 
                                                 
90  Cf. International Crisis Group 2004, pp. 20f.; Human Rights Watch 2004, pp. 21f.; United Nations Security Council 
2004, p. 12. 
91  Cf. Human Rights Watch 2004, pp. 26-59. 
92  Interviews with UNMIK police officers, Prizren and Prishtina, 28-30 May 2004. 
93  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2004b, p. 8; UNMIK 2004; interviews with UNMIK Police representatives, Ko-
sovo, March 2005. 
94  Interviews with KPS CAST members, Prishtina, 29 May 2004.  
95  Independent of these specific incidents, ethnically mixed patrols were suspended temporarily by UNMIK after the 
March 2004 riots, because some Serbian officers had been afraid to enter Albanian villages. On the other hand, 
UNMIK and the KPS had avoided provoking the Serbian population by sending Albanian officers into their villages. 
96  Cf. United Nations Security Council 2004b, p. 8; interview with UNMIK police representative, Prishtina, 20 March 
2005. 
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 significant obstacle to their further training. Structural and conceptual deficiencies of the 
training programmes themselves also play a role in the inadequate skills of these newly 
trained officers. As far as the basic academy training is concerned, the most important 
problems resulted from the need to teach an enormous syllabus within a very short time. 
Because lessons given by international instructors had to be translated from English into 
Serbian, Albanian or Macedonian, the already short training time was additionally cut by 
half or even two thirds. Moreover, basic training suffered in South Serbia and Macedonia 
from too many theoretical lessons and the lack of knowledge and old-fashioned teaching 
styles of local police instructors. The deficiencies in the field training were primarily related 
to training periods that were too short to allow the new police officers to transfer their theo-
retical knowledge into practical experience. This problem of time was aggravated by a lack 
of personnel resources. Inadequate numbers of international and local field trainers did not 
permit intensive mentoring of the new officers. Moreover, field trainers had quite different 
levels of knowledge and motivation.  
 
Consequently, the substance of the field training could not be sufficiently standardized. In 
addition to educational deficits, in all three cases a number of local police officers were not 
suitable because of their criminal backgrounds or other negative personality traits. Never-
theless, these officers were recruited due to political pressure by representatives of all eth-
nic communities. As the OSCE was only in a supporting role with respect to the recruit-
ment process in South Serbia and Macedonia, the organization’s options for intervention 
were rather limited. In Kosovo, where the OSCE and the UN had the sole responsibility for 
recruiting, they had severe problems in getting reliable information about the applicants, 
because relevant documents had vanished during the war. Last but not least, the pressure 
to integrate as many ‘minority officers’ as possible within an extremely short period of time 
led the international organizations to give even unsuitable candidates a chance.  
 
The results of the case studies do not permit a clear assessment of the impact of the incor-
poration of former combatants on the functioning of the police. Relevant perceptions of in-
ternational and local police officers indicate that former combatants do indeed represent an 
obstacle to the proper functioning of the police despite the fact that the majority of them so 
far have not stood out in a negative way during training or on duty. 
 
Other reasons for the frequently unprofessional performance of new police officers were 
related to specific structural deficiencies of the post-socialist police forces in Serbia and 
Macedonia. The over-centralized command structures in Serbia and Macedonia are a sig-
nificant obstacle to autonomous decision-making among lower-ranking police officers. 
Centralized structures also give way to political interference in operational measures and in 
the career development of individual police officers. A thorough reform of the Serbian and 
Macedonian police laws, which could contain these problems and adjust the performance 
of the police services to EU standards, is still far from complete. A related problem, provi-
ding fertile ground for corruption, is the low salaries of police officers. While the reputation 
of the police in this respect is quite poor in general, the Kosovar police still enjoy consider-
able trust among the Albanian population. 
 
Finally, effective police work is seriously hampered in all tree cases by the low level of co-
operation between the police and the judiciary, and particularly by the severe deficiencies 
within the judiciary itself. Inefficient, corrupt, politicized and biased courts undermine the 
law enforcement actions of the police, thereby weakening the state’s monopoly of force. 
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 5.2 Conclusions 
 
The record of international efforts in creating multi-ethnic police services in the Balkans is 
rather limited and based only on brief experience. Nevertheless, important steps towards 
achieving initial operational readiness of these new police services have been made.  
 
In all three cases, the key problem remains the low and functionally inadequate level of 
training and, in consequence, the qualifications of the multi-ethnic units. However, while 
UNMIK has put a lot of effort into reducing these deficits and, with a few exceptions, has 
transferred the operational authority to the local police, police authorities in South Serbia 
and Macedonia are reluctant to integrate the new multi-ethnic units into the regular police 
forces, particularly the criminal police and the special units. If the integration problem re-
mains unresolved and the special units remain ethnic domaînes reservées, there is a real 
danger that the concept of multi-ethnic police could degenerate into a mere symbolic ges-
ture. This would not only mean stagnation, but would also involve the risk of serious re-
gression. Once the population and the officers themselves have come to the conclusion 
that multi-ethnic units represent second or third choice and thus cannot be taken seriously, 
the whole concept of employing multi-ethnic police to build peace in post-conflict situations 
will be called into question. While it was reasonable and necessary at the beginning to fo-
cus on the quantitative goal of deploying a sufficient number of multi-ethnic units as soon 
as possible, the focus must – now, and for the years to come – be on improving the per-
formance of the new officers if the concept of multi-ethnic police is not to be undermined. 
 
Winning the trust of all ethnic population groups is even more difficult than establishing the 
police’s operational readiness. This requires a process of ethno-political rethinking within 
all ethnic communities which cannot be initiated and supported by administrative means, 
such as job incentives or disciplinary measures. What is needed is a true, voluntary, and 
broadly autonomous learning process, something that is much more difficult to achieve. A 
necessary condition for such learning processes − but not a sufficient one − is that multi-
ethnic units prove in practice that they are capable of securing the rights of all ethnic 
groups in an even-handed manner. And precisely this has, so far, been a serious problem 
in all three cases. As important as favourable political conditions are – i.e. moderate politi-
cians, confidence-building programmes and projects such as community policing or com-
munity advisory groups –, the core question for building confidence is whether the multi-
ethnic police are capable of functioning as a reliable guarantor of the state’s monopoly of 
force. So far, this has been only partially achieved in all three mission areas. 
 
Therefore, it is essential that the international actors continue their efforts to professiona-
lize the new police services in the Balkans. The member states of the OSCE, the EU and 
the UN have recognized that the establishment of sound and accountable security institu-
tions is a crucial element of sustainable post-conflict peace-building in the Western Bal-
kans, which would allow them, at some point, to pull out their troops from the region. Fur-
thermore, the EU members have also become aware of the fact that the creation of effec- 
tive police forces is indispensable for combating organized crime in this region that also 
threatens the security of Western European states. Since the Balkan states cannot be ex-
pected to solve these problems on their own, it is in the best interests of EU states to pro-
vide long-term support for the reform of the police and other elements of the security sec-
tor.  
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 5.3 Recommendations  
 
Police reform in post-conflict transformation societies is a complex and challenging en-
deavour. It needs sustained support, as the final outcome of reform efforts cannot be de-
termined within two or three years. For this reason, international actors must be prepared 
to engage in police reforms for longer periods.  
 
5.3.1 Provision of Personnel  
The different tasks of international police personnel, ranging from training, monitoring, and 
advising up to armed law enforcement, require more specialized staff and more training 
before and during missions. There is an urgent need for more and better qualified instruc-
tors, both at academies and in the field. These instructors, in turn, should undergo pre-
mission training in order to be brought to the same level of competence and to familiarize 
themselves with mission-specific training programmes. This is essential to ensure stan-
dardized teaching of course content. In addition to instructors, police reform missions re-
quire an even larger number of monitors and advisers who can be co-located at police sta-
tions and even at the ministerial level to monitor the implementation of police reforms and 
provide assistance to their local counterparts.  
 
With respect to the three cases analyzed, it would have been advisable to extend the EU 
police presence in Macedonia with the same number of personnel following the termination 
of the Proxima mandate in December 2005. Proxima’s replacement with a much smaller 
EU Police Assistance Team (EUPAT) in December 200597 and the further downsizing of 
the OSCE’s Police Development Unit do not seem to be the appropriate measures in view 
of the fact that the implementation of police reforms in Macedonia actually only started in 
January 2005 and is far from complete. Macedonian authorities will need further monitoring 
and advice from the EU and the OSCE, if they are to have a chance to adjust their security 
sector to EU standards and fulfil the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession. The same ap-
plies to the Serbian authorities. As for Kosovo, the police mission will have to continue its 
work for years to come, either under the umbrella of the UN or of the EU. In addition to trai-
ners, monitors, and advisers, the Kosovo mission needs international specialists for com-
bating organized crime and riot control, since the KPS does not yet have sufficient capabili-
ties to effectively fulfil these tasks on their own. 
 
5.3.2 Provision of Material and Conceptual Resources 
In order to set up missions quickly and avoid repeating mistakes already made, pre-
mission planning, including mission-specific needs-assessment in the field is needed at the 
earliest possible stage. Mission-specific training curricula must consider local legal and cul-
tural specifics to avoid impracticable training content. International organizations should 
therefore establish analytical and planning units, run databases with standard curricula, 
and compare and evaluate the existing training concepts of the different missions. 
 
Experience has shown that basic academy training should not be less than 12 weeks if the 
necessary minimum content is to be taught. The three cases have also demonstrated the 
importance of including a significant number of practical training sessions. With respect to 
field training, there is a need for more intensive mentoring and better integration of new of-
ficers into daily police work to give them the opportunity to acquire practical experience. 
                                                 
97  The Proxima contingent of 140 police officers was replaced by only around 30 police advisors (cf. European Union 
Council Secretariat 2005, p. 2). 
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 As for material resources, police training missions need start-up kits containing basic office 
and classroom equipment. The three case studies have also shown the need for conside-
rable financial resources for the refurbishment of training facilities. With respect to the fight 
against organized crime, host countries will need high-tech equipment, in particular IT 
equipment and equipment for forensics and crimes scene management.  
 
At the same time, donor co-ordination should be improved to avoid duplication and incom-
patibility of donated equipment and training programmes. The development of a related da-
tabase covering international police assistance projects would be a great help for pro-
gramme co-ordinators. The ‘Inventory Initiative’ on ‘Security Sector Reform in South East-
ern Europe’, a database project carried out by the Centre for International Security Studies 
(YCISS) at York University,98 is a first important step in this direction. However, a more ex-
tensive database covering all regions in which the UN, the OSCE and the EU are engaged 
in security sector reforms is needed. 
 
5.3.3 Implementation of Reform Programmes 
With respect to the sustainability of police reforms, the international community cannot 
avoid exerting considerable political pressure on the host states to implement new legisla-
tion regulating the tasks and structures of the police forces. This is essential for making po-
lice work more effective, de-politicizing the police, dismantling over-centralized command 
structures, making career developments more transparent, fighting human rights violations 
and other forms of police misconduct, isolating radical political groups, and strengthening 
the co-operation between the police and the judiciary.  
 
In Kosovo, the international community must ensure that the positive achievements of the 
KPS are not reversed by radical forces, should the province gain (conditional) indepen-
dence from Serbia. In the cases of South Serbia and Macedonia, sustained political pres-
sure will be necessary to achieve the integration of multi-ethnic units in all branches of the 
police, particularly in the special police units.  
 
5.3.4 Efforts to Win the Trust of All Ethnic Groups 
Finally, more efforts are needed to win the trust of ethnic Serbians and Macedonians in the 
multi-ethnic police. Only if this can be achieved can one really speak of successful integra-
tion. The creation of Crime Prevention Councils (Kosovo), Community Advisory Groups 
(South Serbia) and Citizens Advisory Groups (Macedonia) at municipality level, and the in-
troduction of specifically trained Community Policing Officers are important steps in this di-
rection. International missions, in co-operation with civil societies, must also continue to put 
more effort into explaining the overall purpose and proper functioning of such institutions to 
the local population. 
 
                                                 
98  This project is implemented on behalf of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (Working Table III on Security 
Issues), see http://ssr.yciss.yorku.ca/ (30 July 2005).  
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 Appendix 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
CORE   Centre for OSCE Research 
EUPOL  European Police  
ICITAP   International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (of the 
  USA) 
KFOR   Kosovo Force 
KPS   Kosovo Police Service 
KPS-CAST  Kosovo Police Service Counselling And Support Team 
KPSS   Kosovo Police Service School 
MEPE   Multi-Ethnic Police Element (South Serbia)  
MTA   Military Technical Agreement 
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization 
OMiFRY  OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
OMIK   OSCE Mission in Kosovo 
OMiSaM  OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro  
OSCE   Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
TI   Transparency International 
UCK   Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves/Kosovo Liberation Army   
UCK   Ushtria Clirimtare Kombetare/National Liberation Army (in Macedonia)  
UCPMB  Ushtria Clirimtare e Presheves Medvexhes dhe Bujanovicit/Liberation 
Army of Presevo, Medvedja und Bujanovac (South Serbia) 
UN   United Nations 
UNCIVPOL  United Nations Civilian Police  
UNMIK   United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
USA   United States of America  
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